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                                                   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2110 
___________ 
 
NAOMI MERENTEK, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
                                  Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-940-380) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: January 18, 2013)                                                                        
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 2 
 
 Naomi Merentek, an ethnic Chinese Christian from Indonesia, petitions for review 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we discuss that background only briefly here.  Merentek last entered the 
United States in 2006, and ultimately stayed beyond the time allowed under her visa.  
After being placed in removal proceedings, she applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming that she had 
been persecuted in Indonesia on account of her religion and race.  In April 2010, an 
immigration judge (“IJ”) denied that application.  Merentek then appealed that decision 
to the BIA. 
 In March 2012, the BIA dismissed Merentek’s appeal.  With respect to her asylum 
claim, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s determination that she “ha[d] not met her 
burden of establishing her eligibility for asylum because she ha[d] not provided specific 
persuasive testimony or objective corroborating evidence that she suffered past 
persecution or ha[d] a well-founded fear of future persecution.”  (A.R. 3)  The BIA 
agreed with the IJ that Merentek “ha[d] not demonstrated through persuasive evidence 
that her race or religion was at least one central reason for the threats she received while 
in Indonesia.”  (Id.)  Additionally, the BIA determined that Merentek had not shown that, 
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if she returned to Indonesia, “she would be individually singled out for persecution or 
that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to 
. . . her.”  (Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).)  The BIA echoed the 
IJ’s finding that “most Christian churches operate openly in Indonesia,” and noted that 
the U.S. State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report for Indonesia “shows that the 
Indonesian government has made significant improvements in the relations between 
ethnic and religious minorities and other groups.”  (Id.)  The BIA concluded that, because 
Merentek had not met the standard for asylum, she had also failed to meet the higher 
standard for withholding of removal.  Lastly, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Merentek 
had not established that she was entitled to CAT relief. 
 Merentek now seeks review of the agency’s decision.                    
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(1).  “When, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision and adds analysis of its 
own, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.”  Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 
408, 411 (3d Cir. 2012).  “We apply substantial evidence review to agency findings of 
fact, departing from factual findings only where a reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.”  Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 F.3d 
187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  We review constitutional 
claims de novo.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 Merentek raises four arguments in support of her petition.  First, she claims that 
the agency erred by failing to consider whether her experiences in Indonesia, when 
evaluated cumulatively, rose to the level of past persecution.  To demonstrate past 
persecution, Merentek had to show, inter alia, that her race or religion was “at least one 
central reason for persecuting [her].”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see Espinosa-Cortez v. 
Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 2010).  Given the inconsistencies amongst her two 
affidavits and her oral testimony, a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to 
disturb the BIA’s conclusion that Merentek “has not demonstrated through persuasive 
evidence that her race or religion was at least one central reason for the threats she 
received while in Indonesia.”  (A.R. 3)  Accordingly, her instant claim fails. 
 Merentek next contends that the BIA violated her Fifth Amendment due process 
rights by failing to conclude that her evidence established a pattern or practice of 
persecution of Christians in Indonesia.
1
  Having carefully considered that evidence, we 
cannot conclude that it compels such a finding.  Nor are we persuaded that the BIA’s 
consideration of her pattern or practice claim ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 
 Merentek’s third claim is that the BIA erred in denying her CAT claim.2  To 
obtain relief under the CAT, an alien must show that she would likely be tortured if 
                                              
1
 To the extent the Government contends that Merentek’s “pattern or practice” claim was 
not exhausted before the BIA, such a contention is meritless because the BIA specifically 
addressed that claim.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 125 (3d Cir. 2008). 
2
 Although the Government seems to argue to the contrary, Merentek did include this 
claim in her brief.  Accordingly, the Government’s waiver argument lacks merit. 
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removed to the country in question.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  Here, the BIA 
concluded that Merentek failed to meet that standard, and she provides no evidence that 
would compel a contrary conclusion.  Accordingly, the instant claim fails. 
 Merentek’s final claim is that the BIA violated her Fifth Amendment due process 
rights by failing to employ the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 
“disfavored group” analysis in evaluating her requests for asylum and withholding of 
removal.
3
  This claim is meritless.  We previously rejected the “disfavored group” 
analysis in Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 538 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005), and later declined to 
revisit the issue in Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 235 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008).  We find no 
reason to chart a different course here, let alone conclude that the BIA’s decision 
amounted to a constitutional violation.       
 In light of the above, we will deny Merentek’s petition.   
                                              
3
 Although Merentek did not exhaust this claim, we nevertheless have jurisdiction to 
consider it.  See Mudric v. Att’y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that 
“due process claims are generally exempt from the exhaustion requirement”).  
